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TILA: THE TEXTUALIST-INTENTIONALIST LITMUS ACT?
Caroline Hatton*
Statutory interpretation is the Cinderella of legal scholarship. Once
1
scorned and neglected, confined to the kitchen, it now dances in the ballroom.
I. INTRODUCTION
2

The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is a broad, consumerprotective statute that requires lenders to disclose their terms to
consumers and governs the manner and timing of this disclosure in a
3
range of commercial transactions. TILA’s rescission provision allows
consumers to annul contracts made without the disclosure TILA
4
requires, and its codification as Regulation Z prescribes the manner
in which rescission may be accomplished.
Courts have found Regulation Z’s prescription unclear and have
employed different interpretive methodologies to decipher exactly
what steps consumers must take to rescind. The Eighth, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits determined via an intentionalist analysis that
consumers must file a complaint with the court to effectuate
5
rescission. The Third and Fourth Circuits, on the other hand,
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15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2012).
3
15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012).
4
12 C.F.R. §1026 (2012) (formerly §226).
5
Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013); McOmie-Gray v.
Bank of Am. Homes, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012); Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA,
681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit has also held that a borrower must
file a complaint to rescind in a very recent unpublished decision. See Lumpkin v.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 12-2317, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16576, at *7–8
(6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2013). The Lumpkin Court, however, states that “[o]ther circuits
have uniformly interpreted Beach to preclude the precise argument Lumpkin makes
here” and supports this proposition by citing only Rosenfield, McOmie, and an
unpublished case from the Third Circuit that has been superseded by Sherzer v.
Homestar Mortgage Services, 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013). See id.; see also infra note
135 (discussing the now-superseded, non-precedential Williams v. Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage, Inc., 410 F. App’x 495 (3d Cir. 2011)). The Lumpkin Court then declares
on the basis of this perceived uniformity that “Lumpkin must not only give notice of
his intent to rescind—which he failed to do—but also prove in a court of law that he
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concluded from textualist readings of the statute that borrowers can
6
rescind by notifying lenders. As district courts around the country
enter decisions on the matter, the rift created by adherence to these
two interpretive schools is growing ever deeper. The Supreme Court
will undoubtedly determine the procedural requirement for
rescission under TILA, and will likely address the true nature of the
Circuit split surrounding the rescission requirement as well.
That does not mean, however, that the provision is headed for a
textualist-intentionalist showdown: As this comment argues, this
methodological conflict masks two less conspicuous but potentially
dispositive questions whose resolution could obviate the need to favor
one interpretive school over another. First, should lower courts be
bound by conjectural Court dicta; second, should the Court defer to
the agency that now holds regulatory authority over TILA, although
that agency did not exist when TILA was codified? To see how an
apparent textualist-intentionalist clash holds dramatic consequences
both for the scope of precedent and for administrative law, it is
necessary to trace the history of TILA and recent TILA litigation.
Congress enacted TILA in 1968 to combat deceptive practices by
predatory lenders that left consumers unaware of the nature of the
credit obligations they undertook and unable to conduct meaningful
7
comparison of offers. “[S]uch blind economic activity,” then-Under
Secretary of the Treasury Joseph Barr explained, “is inconsistent with
8
the efficient functioning of a free economic system such as ours.”
TILA, an intended remedy for these commercial ills, is
accordingly broad in scope. As Senator Paul Douglas announced in
proposing TILA, “this bill does not provide for judgment solely on
the basis of the . . . annual interest rate or the total finance charges.
It also provides that there shall be a statement of the cash price or
9
delivery price of the property or service to be acquired.”
By
has a right to rescind. His right to bring such a suit has now expired.” Lumpkin,
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16576, at *8 (citing Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410,
417 (1998)). As this Comment demonstrates, however, there is no uniformity among
circuits regarding this issue, nor is it a given that Beach is applicable. See infra Parts
II.B. and III.
6
See generally Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012);
Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services, 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013). Several Judges
of the Eighth Circuit have filed dissents or concurrences that side with the Third and
Fourth Circuit; for details, see infra notes 163–182 and accompanying text.
7
See Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 363–64 (1973).
8
Id. (quoting Hearings on H. R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of
the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 76 (1967).
9
Id. at 367–68 (quoting Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Subcomm. on Production and
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requiring lenders to disclose both total price and finance charges,
“the judgment of the consumer can be on the basis of both of these
10
factors, not merely on one alone.”
TILA’s introductory provision adopts these broad goals of
enhanced economic stabilization and strengthened “competition
among the various financial institutions . . . engaged in the extension
11
of consumer credit.” TILA aims “to assure a meaningful disclosure
of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
12
readily the various credit terms available to him.” This “awareness of
the cost” of credit will lead to “the informed use of credit” by
13
consumers, which, in turn, will strengthen the American economy.
Congress framed TILA in general terms to leave room for the
Federal Reserve Board (the “Board”) to adapt TILA enforcement to
creditor schemes. “Congress was clearly aware that merchants could
evade the reporting requirements of the Act by concealing credit
charges. In delegating rulemaking authority to the Board, Congress
14
emphasized the Board’s authority to prevent such evasion.” The
Board exercised its sweeping power “by promulgating Regulation Z,
12 [C.F.R.] Part 226 (1979), which at least partly fills the statutory
15
gaps.”
Although Regulation Z addresses many modes of consumer
manipulation, “[e]ven Regulation Z . . . cannot speak explicitly to
16
every credit disclosure issue.”
The Court issued an interpretive
directive for when neither TILA itself, nor Regulation Z, speaks
directly to a new strain of consumer deception: “consider the implicit
17
character of the statutory scheme.”
In construing TILA-derived
causes of action, in other words, courts must be guided by TILA’s

Stabilization of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong. 447–48 (1961)
(statement of Sen. Douglas)).
10
Id. at 368 (quoting Hearings on S. 1740 (statement of Sen. Douglas)).
11
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 371 (1973). In fact, the Court
observed: “[t]o hold that Congress did not intend the Board to take action against
this type of manipulation would require us to believe that, despite this emphasis,
Congress intended the obligations established by the Act to be open to evasion by
subterfuges of which it was fully aware.” Id. The Court then firmly rejected this
possibility: “the language of the enabling provision precludes us from accepting so
narrow an interpretation of the Board’s power.” Id.
15
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560 (1980).
16
Id.
17
Id.
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consumer-protective purpose.
In furtherance of its consumer-protective purpose, TILA gives
borrowers the right to rescind non-compliant loan agreements and
provides that “[a]n obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three
years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the
18
sale of the property, whichever occurs first.” Regulation Z, in turn,
sets forth specific manners in which borrowers may notify lenders of
their intent to rescind:
(2) To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall
notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram, or
other means of written communication.
Notice is
considered given when mailed, or when filed for
telegraphic transmission, or, if sent by other means, when
delivered to the creditor’s designated place of business.
(3) . . . If the required notice and material disclosures are
not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after
the occurrence giving rise to the right of rescission, or upon
transfer of all of the consumer’s interest in the property, or
19
upon sale of the property, whichever occurs first.
As detailed as this provision appears, courts are now grappling with
its scope with some frequency. In order to trigger rescission within
the three year limit, what must a consumer do?
Neither TILA nor Regulation Z answers this question directly.
Indeed, a key sentence in 12 C.F.R. § 15(a)(2)—”To exercise the
right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of the
rescission by mail, telegram, or other means of written
communication.”—is subject to two irreconcilable interpretations:
either notice is a sufficient condition (as soon as the consumer
notifies that creditor, the right to rescind has been exercised), or it is
merely a necessary one (the right to rescind cannot be exercised
without providing notice to the creditor).
Courts
have
tied
the
necessary-or-sufficient-condition
determination to a choice of interpretive methodologies, with the
intentionalists reading the notice as necessary and the textualists
20
reading it to be sufficient.
Curiously, those courts that stress
congressional intent are the same courts that limit consumer
21
rescission to preserve clarity of title, a stance seemingly at odds with
18

15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012).
12 C.F.R. § 226.15(a)(ii)(2)–(3) (2013).
20
See infra Part III.
21
This can be seen in recent decisions from the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits. See infra Part III.
19
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TILA’s self-proclaimed pro-consumer purpose. The textualists, on
the other hand, who strive to apply Congress’s words without heed to
what Congress might have meant to say, read the regulation as
23
requiring only notice.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has filed
multiple amicus briefs urging a strict textualist interpretation of this
statute and regulation, such as the approach adopted by the
24
25
conservative Fourth Circuit. Created in 2010 and operational as of
26
2011, the CFPB was not even a gleam in the eye of the executive
27
branch when the Board promulgated Regulation Z back in 1969.
Now, however, the CFPB has taken over the reins of TILA; indeed,
“the newly formed Consumer Financial Protection Bureau . . .
assume[d] primary regulatory authority over the mortgage industry
28
and exclusive rulemaking authority under TILA. Consequently, the
CFPB’s interpretation of TILA regulations warrants judicial
deference, and its strong policy arguments support the notice-as22

See supra text accompanying notes 7–13.
See infra Part III. It is tempting to look for a reflection of politics in this split,
but it has become increasingly difficult to associate interpretive methodologies with
political leanings. See infra notes 24, 29. For an excellent discussion of the
correlation between political affiliation and panel voting, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID
SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 17–40 (2006).
24
See Robert Bostrom, CFPB Files Amicus Brief in TILA Case, Says More to Come
(Apr. 16, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://mondaq-business.vlex.com/vid
/cfpb-files-amicus-in-tila-case-more-365470614. Could this be another sign that the
Fourth Circuit has begun to shift to the left? For a concise discussion of the Fourth
Circuit’s conservative past and recent ideological movement, see David Stout, 4th
Circuit Turns Left, Leaving ‘Most Conservative’ Label Behind (Nov. 23, 2011, 11:47 AM),
http://www.mainjustice.com/2011/11/23/
4th-circuit-turns-left-leaving-most-conservative-label-behind/.
25
See
THE
CONSUMER
FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (“The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank
Act) established the consumer bureau. In January of 2012, President Obama
appointed Rich Cordray to be the first Director of the CFPB.”).
26
See Wally Adeyemo, September 2010: Transfer Date Announced, CFPB BLOG (Sept.
9, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/2011/02/ (“Less than
two months after President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act into law, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner announced that
the one-year anniversary of the law—July 21, 2011—will serve as the ‘designated
transfer date’ . . . . when consumer financial protection functions of seven federal
agencies will transfer to the CFPB.”).
27
See Gambardella v. G. Fox & Co., 716 F.2d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The FRB
promulgated Regulation Z in 1969.”).
28
Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 773
F. Supp. 2d 151, 167 (D.D.C. 2011).
23
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sufficient reading of TILA’s rescission provision.
Although it is somewhat surprising that the CFPB, the product of
a liberal administration, advocates a textualist construction of section
29
1635(f), it comes as no surprise that TILA rescission has become a
textualist-intentionalist battleground: TILA has hosted such wars in
the past. In Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Incorporated v. Nigh, a divided
Court explored both the meaning and the proper manner of
30
interpreting TILA’s Damages-Ceiling Provision. In Beach v. Ocwen
Federal Bank, a unanimous Court held that TILA’s rescission provision
fully extinguishes the right to rescind unlike a statute of limitations,
31
which would extinguish only the right to file a cause of action.
Though the Court employed a textual analysis in reaching this
32
decision, its conclusion stressed the importance of legislative intent.
Courts involved in the current circuit split have been deciding
not only whether notice suffices to trigger TILA rescission, but also
33
the relevance of the Court’s decision in Beach. Because Beach is not
exactly on point, it would govern only to the extent that the
interpretive mechanism it employs should be extended to other TILA
provisions. The question thus becomes whether methodological
precedent can be set, and, if so, what exactly such precedent would
impose upon lower courts. The applicability of Beach is polarizing,
with the intentionalists declaring Beach to control and the textualists
34
rejecting Beach as unrelated.
This comment will argue that, in determining how TILA
rescission is accomplished, the Court should also find that Beach does
not control and should instead defer to the CFPB’s interpretation.
Although the circuits present these issues in textualist and
intentionalist terms, the Court need not—and should not—name
either interpretive methodology victorious.
Both schools are
fundamentally positivistic. By allowing them to coexist, the Court has
created an epistemological friction that transcends the rigidity either
29

The CFPB’s textualism, see infra Part III.B, corresponds with the rise of “New
Textualism.” For a discussion of the important trend among liberals to perform
textualist analysis, see, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Rosen on the “New Textualism”, PRAWFSBLAWG
(June 13, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com
/prawfsblawg/2012/06/rosen-on-the-new-textualism.html.
30
543 U.S. 50 (2004); see infra Part II.A.
31
523 U.S. 410 (1998); see infra Part II.B.
32
See id. at 418–19; see also infra Part II.B (discussing Beach at length).
33
See infra Part II.
34
See infra Parts III.A and III.B (discussing the intentionalist and textualist
approaches, respectively).
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method would impose on its own.
Part II of this comment explores the textualist-intentionalist
clash in the Court’s Koons Buick decision. The many opinions written
in this case offer a glimpse of what a decision regarding the rescission
mechanism might, and should, look like. Part II next explores Beach
and its limits. Beach incarnates the other great interpretive clash in
TILA’s history.
Part III moves to the current circuit split, which continues to
expand as new decisions are handed down. Subpart A focuses on the
Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ intentionalist views of rescission.
Subpart B explores the Third and Fourth Circuits’ textualist readings
of Regulation Z.
Part IV.A argues that the Court should declare Beach inapposite;
Part IV.B, that the Court should defer to the CFPB’s interpretation of
Regulation Z. Part V, the conclusion, revisits the background and
stakes of the current circuit split. Despite the textualist-intentionalist
lines along which the circuits examine TILA rescission, the Court
should resolve the issue without favoring either interpretive school.
II. PAST TILA BATTLES
A. A Subparagraph by Any Other Name: The Damages-Ceiling Dispute
Until 1995, the provision that set guidelines for TILA damages
awards proclaimed that non-compliant lenders would be liable to
borrowers
in an amount equal to the sum of— . . . (2)(A)(i) in the
case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the
case of an individual action relating to a consumer lease
under part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total
monthly payments under the lease, except that the liability
under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor
35
greater than $1000 . . . .
Courts widely held that the $100–$1000 limit applied both to subpart
(i) and to subpart (ii), which were viewed as parts of the same
36
“subparagraph.” Thus, the range of $100–$1000 was applied to all
35

15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1980).
See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 55–56 (2004)
(“Following the insertion of the consumer lease provision, courts consistently held
that the $100/$1,000 limitation remained applicable to all consumer financing
transactions, whether lease or loan.”) (citing Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91
F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1996); Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 941
36
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damage awards set forth in § 1640(a)(2).
The statute remained unaltered from 1976 to 1995, when
obfuscation struck: in its Act of September 30, 1995, Congress
amended subsection (a)(2) by “substitut[ing] ‘(ii)’ for ‘or (ii)’ and
37
insert[ing]” a third subpart.
As a result, 15 USC §
1640(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) now imposes liability
in an amount equal to the sum of— . . . (2)(A)(i) in the
case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction, (ii) in the case of
an individual action relating to a consumer lease under part
E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total monthly
payments under the lease, except that the liability under
this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater
than $1000, or (iii) in the case of an individual action
relating to a credit transaction not under an open end
credit plan that is secured by real property or a dwelling,
38
not less than $200 or greater than $2000 . . . .
Does “under this subparagraph” still to apply to both parts (i) and
(ii) when it manifestly cannot apply to (iii)? Or did the 1995
iteration of the statute effectively detach the first part from the
second, such that the ceiling now applies only to part (ii)? Did
Congress, without changing the signifier employed, alter that which it
signified?
The Seventh Circuit was the first to take aim at the moving target
created by Congress’s 1995 amendment. After affirming that the
39
statute was clear and unambiguous until the 1995 addition, the
Strange court announced that the addendum “was designed simply to
establish a more generous minimum and maximum for certain
secured transactions [i.e. those secured by real estate], without
changing the rule on minimum and maximum damage awards for
40
the other two parts of § 1640(a)(2)(A).”
41
With its connotations of draftsmanship seasoned with hints of
(7th Cir. 1995); Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th
Cir. 1983); Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow Fin. Co., 661 F.2d 1186, 1191 n.7 (8th Cir.
1981) (per curiam); Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 358, 359 n.17 (5th Cir.
1979)).
37
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2012).
38
Id.
39
Strange v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga., 129 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1997).
40
Id. (emphasis added).
41
See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 459 (2d ed. 2005) (defining
“design” as to “decide upon the look and functioning of (a building, garment, or
other object), typically by making a detailed drawing of it”).

HATTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

1/10/2014 3:49 PM

COMMENT

215

42

intent, “designed” is a succinct masterstroke of evasion. Indeed, the
court matched the statutory ambiguity of which it complains with an
exegetical ambiguity no less notable. The structural aspect of
“designed”—design as draftsmanship—evokes textualism; the plandriven, plotting aspect of the same word implicates intentionalism.
Without offering any further insight into its reasoning, the Strange
court simply concluded that “the ‘subparagraph’ mentioned in §
1640(a)(2)(A)(ii) continues to encompass what is now codified as
43
subparts (A)(i) and (A)(ii), not just subpart (A)(ii).”
The Fourth Circuit took a more direct and explicit approach in
44
Nigh.
Judge Gregory’s dissent lauds “the Seventh Circuit’s well45
reasoned analysis,” and even the Nigh majority remarked that “[i]t
could well be . . . that Congress did not intend to alter the statutory
cap applicable under subparagraph (A)(i) when it amended the
46
statute in 1995.” The majority, however, emphatically refused to
meander down what-if street, asserting that “the critical point of
law—and it is critical—is that we do not know what Congress
intended; all that we have before us is the amended statute from
47
which to determine intent.”
Noting staunchly that “[i]t is the
statute, not any inferential intent, that constitutes the law,” the
majority held that “Congress did alter the statutory cap regardless of
its intent” and observed that Congress was free to amend the statute if
48
it “enacted into law something different from what it intended.”
The majority anchored its textualist approach to the separation of
powers, affirming that “[i]n this way, and in this way only, are the
49
constitutional roles of the legislature and the courts respected.”
The Fourth Circuit majority found that, “by striking the ‘or’
preceding (ii), and inserting (iii) after the ‘under this subparagraph’
phrase,” Congress “rendered [the application of the limit set forth in
50
(ii) to the entirety of § 1640(a)(2)(A)] defunct.” Thus, “Congress’s
amendment requires that the reference point of the ‘under this
subparagraph’ clause be the subparagraph of § 1640 (a)(2)(A)(ii),
42

See Id. (offering as a second definition: “do or plan (something) with a specific
purpose or intention in mind”).
43
Strange, 129 F.3d at 947.
44
Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 319 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2003).
45
Id. at 132 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
46
Id. at 128 (majority opinion).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 319 F.3d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 2003).
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and not the subparagraph of § 1640 (a)(2)(A)(i).”
The Nigh
majority read the word “subparagraph” as having a reduced scope of
52
reference rather than a new meaning.
A divided Supreme Court weighed in to resolve the split that the
Fourth Circuit created with respect to the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
53
in its Koons Buick decision.
The several concurrences and lone
54
dissenting opinion question this approach. The Court’s fractured
response gives some insight into how the current rescission-provision
split may fare when it goes up. Koons Buick provides a full spectrum
of approaches ranging from extreme intentionalism to radical
55
textualism.
In between, the Justices offer possible models of
56
coexistence for the two interpretive methodologies.
The Court ultimately held that the Seventh Circuit had the right
of it and, in so doing, adopted a moderately intentionalist approach.
Justice Ginsburg notes in her plurality opinion that Congress’s
“[l]ess-than-meticulous drafting of the 1995 amendment [(to 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A))] created an ambiguity,” but that the
57
ambiguity was solely textual in nature. “The purpose of the 1995
amendment,” the Justice stresses, “is not in doubt: Congress meant to
raise the minimum and maximum recoveries for closed-end loans
58
secured by real property.”
Guided by this purpose and finding
“scant indication that Congress simultaneously sought to remove the
59
$1,000 cap on loans secured by personal property,” the Court
60
declined to interpret the textual ambiguity as requiring removal,
determining instead that “‘common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘dog that didn’t bark,’ that an amendment
having the effect petitioner ascribes to it would have been differently
51

Id. at 127.
One may wonder at this point whether “subparagraph” should ever have been
understood to encompass § (A)(i) as well as (A)(ii). An abundance of circuit
decisions applied the ceiling to both provisions. See supra note 36. The lack of
legislative backlash in response to these decisions might suggest legislative
ratification of this interpretation.
53
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (2004).
54
Id. at 65–76.
55
Id. at 60–76.
56
Id. at 60–63.
57
Id. at 53.
58
Id.
59
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 53 (2004).
60
See id. at 63–64 (“[T]he text does not dictate [removing the limit]; the
statutory history suggests otherwise; and there is scant indication Congress meant to
change the well-established meaning of clause (i).”).
52
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described by its sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the
61
floor manager of the bill.’”
Although the plurality attributes great significance to
congressional intent, or the absence thereof, it frames its
intentionalist inquiry as a “step two” that can only follow a
62
preliminary finding of textual ambiguity.
Thus, though Justice
Ginsburg applies a strong form of intentionalism—the determination
of what was meant as a function of what was not said—the Justice
simultaneously subordinates intentionalist analysis to an initial
63
textual inquiry.
Justice Ginsburg’s textualist-intentionalist
compromise garnered the signatures of a plurality of the Justices, and
64
may indicate how the current circuit split will be resolved. The
many other opinions proffered in Koons Buick, of course, offer
possible alternatives.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred to assert a
65
stronger form of intentionalism.
Rather than “only look at
legislative history for the purpose of resolving textual ambiguities or
to avoid absurdities,” Justice Stevens admonishes, “[i]t would be wiser

61

Id. at 61 (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. I.R.S., 484 U.S. 9, 17–18
(1987)).
62
Justice Ginsburg makes the secondary nature of the Court’s inquiry into
congressional intent clear, observing that “[t]he statutory history resolves any
ambiguity whether the $100/$1,000 brackets apply to recoveries under clause (i).”
Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 62. Justice Ginsburg’s textualist inquiry is notable in another
respect as well: it marks the first time a Justice invoked the legislative drafting
manuals used by Congress as interpretive authority. For an excellent discussion of
this jurisprudential landmark, see B. J. Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book:
Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185, 186–89
(2010).
63
In finding significance in Justice Ginsburg’s granting of primacy to the
textualist inquiry, I disagree with Jonathan T. Molot, who finds that when “two
interpreters use the same interpretive tools to reach the same interpretive result, [it
does not] really matter that one (the textualist) purports to use context to decide on
a textual meaning while the other (the purposivist) admits that he is adjusting the
text’s meaning to reconcile it with the context.” Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall
of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
64
Not all Justices agree that the text is truly ambiguous. Some suggest, rather,
that the Court imputed ambiguity to the text in order to justify extratextual analysis.
See infra pp. 15–16 for a discussion of Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion and
Justice Scalia’s dissent.
65
Justice Stevens has been described as “the Court’s leading intentionalist.”
Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 275, 325 (1998) (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the
Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 357 (1994)); William D. Popkin, An
“Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV.
1133, 1135 (1992).
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to acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider all available
evidence of Congress’[s] true intent when interpreting its work
66
product,” because “[c]ommon sense is often more reliable than rote
67
repetition of canons of statutory construction.” Decrying “wooden
68
reliance on those canons,” the Justice asserts that “an unambiguous
text describing a plausible policy decision” is not “a sufficient basis for
69
determining the meaning of a statute.”
Noting that the Court
“cannot escape [the] unambiguous statutory command by
proclaiming that it would produce an absurd result,” Justice Stevens
70
notes that it “can, however, escape by using common sense.” To
apply common sense to the present matter involves contemplating
the provision’s history, which reveals that “a busy Congress is fully
71
capable of enacting a scrivener’s error into law.” This willingness to
find statutory error based on conclusions regarding congressional
intent rather than agrammaticality or implausibility is intentionalism
72
at its most extreme.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by the Chief Justice,
advocates a more guarded form of intentionalism. It approves the
73
consultation of “extratextual sources” in the present matter because
“the text is not altogether clear. That means that examination of
other interpretive resources, including predecessor statutes, is
necessary for a full and complete understanding of the congressional
74
intent.”
Justice Kennedy describes intent as a tie-breaker for
determining which of two equally plausible readings of the word
75
“subparagraph” should govern. Textualism is the default rule in
statutory interpretation; intentionalism, a failsafe to be applied on an
as-needed basis, where need is determined not by notions of common
66

Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 65–66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68
Id. at 66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
69
Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
One scholar describes Justice Stevens as “the leader of the intentionalist
camp,” holding the pole opposite the one held by Justice Scalia in the “textualistintentionalist divide.” See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41260, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS: THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 9–11 (2012).
73
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
74
Id. at 66–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75
See id. at 67 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that looking outward when
faced with an ambiguous text is “fully consistent with cases in which, because the
statutory provision had only one plausible textual reading, we did not rely on such
sources”).
67
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sense but by the words of the statute. Whereas Justice Ginsburg’s
intentionalism gets the final word and thus eclipses her textual
76
77
analysis, Justice Kennedy establishes a strict text-intent hierarchy.
Justice Thomas concurred to voice agreement with the results—
though not with the analytical method—of the majority. Justice
78
Thomas advocates a textualist approach, noting that “[i]f the text in
79
this case were clear, resort to anything else would be unwarranted.”
Because, however, the statute “is not a model of the best practices in
80
legislative drafting,” the Justice finds it necessary to look beyond the
letter of the text. Although Justice Thomas does look outward, the
“anything else” that the Justice consults is limited to the fact that parts
(i) and (ii) had been read in a particular way until 1995 and that the
1995 amendment added a part (iii) without altering the extant
81
parts. Absent any affirmative change, suggests Justice Thomas, no
82
interpretive change should take place.
76

In this shift, Justice Ginsburg’s Koons Buick opinion is consonant with what
one scholar has noted to be generally true of the Justice’s “labor and antidiscrimination opinions—although they begin with textual analysis[, they] rely
heavily on legislative history and purpose as well as on agency deference.” James J.
Brudney, The Supreme Court as Interstitial Actor: Justice Ginsburg’s Eclectic Approach to
Statutory Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 889, 892 (2009).
77
See R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court
and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 39 (1997)
(quoting Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)) (discussing supporters of Justice Scalia’s textualism and quoting Justice
Kennedy’s comment that “it does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to
rummage through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in
order to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute with which the Court is
more comfortable”).
78
In discussing Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence, one scholar has written that,
“[s]ince his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1991, Justice Thomas’[s] judicial
fidelity to textualism has served, like a lighthouse on the shore, as a powerful beacon
to the Rehnquist Court, constantly returning it safely to the original intent of the
Framers.” Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the
Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 351, 351–52 (2002).
79
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
80
Id. at 68 (Thomas, J., concurring).
81
See id. at 67 (Thomas, J., concurring). This approach is consistent with Justice
Thomas’s usual interpretive practices. See Judge H. Brent McKnight, The Emerging
Contours of Justice Thomas’s Textualism, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 365, 366 (1999-2000)
(quotation marks omitted) (“Assisted by canons and dictionaries, Justice Thomas
asks whether the statutory text admits of plain interpretation, and if so, then judicial
inquiry is complete; or if there is irreducible ambiguity, and if so looks guardedly
beyond.”).
82
Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 69 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The only substantive
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Alone in his dissent, Justice Scalia adopts an extreme textualist
83
approach, asserting that Congress did effect an affirmative change in
the text when it amended the statute: by adding a part (iii) to which
part (ii) could not possibly apply, Justice Scalia argues, Congress
rendered it textually impossible for part (ii) to continue to be
84
interpreted to govern part (i).
Observing that “[t]he ultimate
question here is not the meaning of ‘subparagraph,’ but the scope of
the exception which contains that term,” Justice Scalia determines
that a corollary of adding part (iii) to § 1640 (a)(2)(A) was to free
85
part (i) of the $100–$1000 window that had been applied to it.
Where the majority finds an accident—an unfortunate side effect that
resulted, intention-free, from the one deliberate change Congress
made—Justice Scalia finds potential legislative economy, a
86
transformation made by absence of change. Justice Scalia faults the
majority for employing the “Canon of Canine Silence” to treat a
change wrought by inaction as a non-change and argues that the
statute should be construed as it now reads, rather than as it once
87
read. The results of uncapping part (i) would not be catastrophic
because the high-amount loans likely to yield large damages are
88
treated in parts (ii) and (iii), which do have fixed limits.
Justice Scalia argues, further, that the Court should respect its
limits: “‘It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting
errors, and to provide for what we might think is the preferred
89
result.’” While Justice Kennedy describes such absolute adherence
change that amendment wrought was the creation of clause (iii) . . . . By so
structuring the amendment, Congress evinced its intent to address only the creation
of a different limit for a specific set of transactions.”).
83
One scholar suggests “deferential textualism” as best suited to describe Justice
Scalia’s brand of textualist inquiry in order to distinguish the Justice’s distinct goal of
deferring to the legislature from traditional “strict textualism.” See Aprill, supra note
65, at 279–80. For the purposes of highlighting the spectrum of approaches
advocated in Koons Buick, this Comment uses “extreme” to mark Justice Scalia’s
dissent as the antipode of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
84
Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85
Id. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 72, 76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the removal of the word “or”
forces a change in the meaning of the statute that reflects a “‘plausible policy
decision’” and stressing that “[t]he Court should not fight the current structure of
the statute merely to vindicate the suspicion that Congress actually made—but
neglected to explain clearly—a different policy decision” (quoting id. at 65 (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
87
Id. at 73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88
See id. at 75–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89
Id. at 76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526,
542 (2004)).
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to the letter of the law “wooden,” Justice Scalia argues it to be a
means of avoiding the “ventriloquism” to which the Court falls prey
when “[t]he Congressional Record or committee reports are used to
make words appear to come from Congress’s mouth which were
90
spoken or written by others.”
Both pure textualism and pure intentionalism yield an
91
unhealthy automatism. The majority’s compromise gives hope that
the Court’s determination of the current notice-of-rescission debate
will be equally circumspect with respect to interpretive methodology.
B. TILA’s Rescission Provision: A Statute of Limitation or Repose?
The Court’s ruling on another provision may make such
92
circumspection difficult. Whereas the damages-ceiling debate may
anticipate the drama to unfold when the Court decides the
mechanics of TILA rescission, some circuits argue that the Court’s
93
decision in Beach, which addresses TILA’s rescission provision itself,
94
bears directly upon the current circuit split.
In Beach the Court reviewed a Florida Supreme Court decision
that conflicted with decisions other courts had reached in
95
interpreting the three-year limit set by § 1635(f).
The Florida
90

Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The potential for automatism inherent in the monist inquiry of both the
textualist and intentionalist schools is concisely encapsulated in Michel Rosenfeld’s
discussion of Ronald Dworkin’s legal philosophy:
[S]ince Dworkin is neither a strict textualist (i.e., he does not believe
that the meaning of a legal text derives exclusively from the “plain
meaning” of the words and phrases contained in it) nor an
intentionalist (i.e., he does not believe that the meaning of a text can
be established by ascertaining its author’s intention), it follows that he
must be able to rely on a hermeneutic approach subject to
intersubjective verification or approval.
MICHEL ROSENFELD, LAW, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND THE CLASH OF CULTURES: A
PLURALIST ACCOUNT 188 (2011). For a discussion of how such pluralism may be
achieved through collaboration and compromise among Justices, see CHRISTOPHER E.
SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSERVATIVE MOMENT 55–
61(1993). For a fascinating parallel between jurisprudential method and musical
interpretation, see Groh’s Liszt: How “Originalist” is Originalism, Anyway?, CHAMBER
MUSIC
TODAY
(Oct.
20,
2007,
1:55
PM),
http://chambermusictoday.blogspot.com/2007/10/grohs-liszt
-how-originalist-is.html (describing textualism and intentionalism as subsets of
conservative originalism in both music and the law, and juxtaposing both
interpretive schools with the pragmatist theory of the living score/Constitution).
92
See supra Part II.A.
93
Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411–19 (1998).
94
See infra Part III.
95
See supra Part I.B. for text of statute.
91
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Supreme Court held that a borrower could not rescind by affirmative
96
The
defense in a suit filed after the three years had elapsed.
Supreme Court of the United States considered—but rejected—the
possibility that § 1635 is a classic “statute of limitation governing only
the institution of suit and accordingly has no effect when a borrower
claims a § 1635 right of rescission as a ‘defense in recoupment’ to a
97
collection action.”
The Court agreed that “as a general matter a defendant’s right
to plead ‘recoupment’ . . . survives the expiration of the period
98
provided by a statute of limitation . . . .” “So long as the plaintiff’s
action is timely,” the Court noted, “a defendant may raise a claim in
recoupment even if he could no longer bring it independently,
99
absent ‘the clearest congressional language’ to the contrary.”
Nevertheless, the Court found that “[t]he issue here is not whether
limitation statutes affect recoupment rights, but whether § 1635(f) is
100
a statute of limitation.”
The Court thus examined “‘whether [the three-year limit]
operates, with the lapse of time, to extinguish the right which is the
foundation for the claim,’ or ‘merely to bar the remedy for its
101
enforcement.’” The latter interpretation would be consistent with a
statute of limitations and would permit borrowers to assert rescission
as an affirmative defense; the former interpretation, in keeping with a
statute of repose, would eliminate the possibility of rescinding, for
102
any reason, beyond the three-year window.
The Court held that
TILA’s rescission provision extinguishes the borrower’s right to
103
rescind and makes no allowance for reviving the right once expired.
The Beach Court’s method of analysis is striking: the Court
96

Beach, 523 U.S. at 414.
Id. at 415.
98
Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted).
99
Id. (quotation and citations omitted).
100
Id. at 416.
101
Id. (quoting Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pa. R.R., 320 U.S. 356, 358–359
(1943)).
102
The Court’s determination that § 1635(f) is not a statute of limitations has
been equated by some circuits with a finding that TILA is a statute of repose. See
infra Parts III.A. and IV.A. (discussing the circuit decisions). The distinction between
statutes of repose and statutes of limitation is a subtle but important one. See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4, at
20–21 (1987) (“Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations . . . the period contained in
a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause
of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.”)).
103
See Beach, 523 U.S. at 414–15.
97
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employs both textualism and intentionalism in a unanimous opinion.
The Court begins by noting that, unlike “a typical statute of
limitation[, which provides] that a cause of action may or must be
104
brought within a certain period of time,” § 1635(f) “says nothing in
105
“[I]nstead,” the Court observes, “[§
terms of bringing an action.”
1635(f)] provides that the ‘right of rescission [under the Act] shall
106
expire’ at the end of the time period.” The Court stresses that the
rescission provision establishes how long the right to rescind lasts
rather than the deadline for filing suit, and in eminently direct
107
terms. Indeed, the Court finds the provision so clear that “[t]here
is no reason . . . to resort to the canons of construction that we use to
108
resolve doubtful cases.”
At this point, the Court’s logic begins to shift. Until now, the
decision clung to the statute’s actual words. After finding § 1635’s
words clear, however, the Court looks elsewhere in TILA and finds
that Congress did insert words to mark other TILA provisions as
109
statutes of limitation. Thus, the Court reasons, Congress chose not
110
to include similar limitations language in § 1635(f). Applying what
111
Justice Scalia has branded the “Canon of Canine Silence,” the Beach
Court remarks: “Where Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely
112
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
The Court then moves further from the text of § 1635,
suggesting that, “[s]ince a statutory right of rescission could cloud a
bank’s title on foreclosure, Congress may well have chosen to
circumscribe that risk, while permitting recoupment damages
104

Id. at 416.
Id. at 417.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
See Beach, 523 U.S. at 416 (noting that “[t]he terms of a typical statute of
limitation provide that a cause of action may or must be brought within a certain
period of time,” and providing examples of such language).
110
See id. at 417–18.
111
See supra Part II.A. Interpreting absence, though common to moderate
textualist inquiries, marks a deviation from the pure textualism with which the Court
begins. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xi–xvii (2012) (listing the fifty-seven canons of
interpretation, which do not include the analysis of unused words).
112
Beach, 523 U.S. at 418 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
105
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regardless of the date a collection action may be brought.”
The
Court thus posits a guess—suitably adorned in the conditional
mood—as to what congressional aim might underlie § 1635(f)’s
structure and function.
In closing, the Court declares that it has chosen to “respect
Congress’s manifest intent by concluding that the Act permits no
federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year
period of § 1635(f) has run. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
114
the Supreme Court of Florida.”
This emphatic conclusion is
slippery, because congressional intent is linked in the opinion both to
the absence of limitations language and to the choice to circumscribe
115
the risk of clouding title.
The first of these reflects analytical
116
inquiry; the second, clearly speculative dicta.
As we turn to the rescission-mechanism split, we will see courts
clash over the weight due the Beach dicta. In theory, Beach is off-topic:
whether § 1635(f) extinguishes a right or a cause of action is not
germane to whether notice must be sent or a suit must be filed. The
Beach conclusion, however, is broad enough to suggest that timely
notice coupled with late filing would subvert Congress’s “manifest
intent” to render the three-year period a sacrosanct outer limit. Is
the Court’s hypothesis regarding congressional intent binding
precedent upon lower courts?
III. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT: HOW DOES ONE RESCIND UNDER
TILA?
When the Court interprets the rescission provision,
113

117

it will

Id. at 418–19 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
115
The Court’s Beach conclusion thus risks participating in a phenomenon that
Judge Pierre N. Laval laments, namely the fact that “more and more, dicta flex
muscle to which . . . they are not entitled by constitutional right.” Pierre N. Laval,
James Madison Lecture, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1249, 1250 (2006). Laval explains the danger posed by overstated dicta:
We judges regularly undertake to promulgate law through utterance of
dictum made to look like a holding-in disguise, so to speak. When we
do so, we seek to exercise a lawmaking power that we do not rightfully
possess. Also, we accept dictum uttered in a previous opinion as if it
were binding law, which governs our subsequent adjudication. When
we do so, we fail to discharge our responsibility to deliberate on and
decide the question which needs to be decided.
Id.
116
See id. at 1258–59 (noting that though it can be difficult to distinguish dicta
from holdings, this distinction is vial in a system of stare decisis).
117
See supra Part I.B. for the text of the relevant statutory provision, 15 U.S.C. §
114
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necessarily either apply or decline to apply Beach. If the Court finds
Beach inapplicable, we may expect a fiery array of interpretations
118
similar to those we analyzed in Koons Buick. If the Court holds that
Beach applies, however, the conclusion that it is Congress’s “manifest
intent” to terminate the right to rescind after three years would force
a finding that a complaint is necessary to trigger rescission. To
anticipate which way the Court may hold—and to assess whether the
answer is bound to a choice between textualism and intentionalism—
we turn to the relevant circuit decisions.
A. Intentionalist Decisions
In McOmie the Ninth Circuit declares itself bound to treat §
119
1635(f) as a statute of repose. “Were we writing on a blank slate,”
the court proclaims, “we might consider whether notification within
three years of the transaction could extend the time limit imposed by
120
§ 1635(f).”
The circuit promptly adds a big “but,” stating that,
121
122
“under the case law of this court and the Supreme Court,
rescission suits must be brought within three years from the
consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice of rescission is
123
delivered within that three-year period.”
Wistfully, the McOmie
court bows before what it deems to be precedent and blames stare
decisis for its holding that a formal filing is necessary to trigger TILA
rescission.
The Ninth Circuit’s reading of the Beach holding, however, is
overly expansive: Beach did not state the rule that the McOmie court
attributes to it. The circuit court extrapolates the Beach “rule” from
the Court’s conclusion that “[t]he plain meaning of the Act . . .
‘permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the
124
3-year period of 1635(f) has run.’” The Ninth Circuit’s focus on “or
otherwise”—which it over-reads—causes it to lose sight of the
question before it, namely whether notice constitutes an exercise of
1635(f).
118
See supra Part II.A.
119
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.
2012).
120
Id.
121
The case law to which the court refers was set forth in Miguel v. Country
Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002). See infra note 125.
122
This is a reference to the Beach decision, discussed supra Part II.B.
123
McOmie, 667 F.3d at 1328.
124
Id. (alteration in the original) (quoting Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 532 U.S.
410, 419 (1998)).
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the right to rescind. By treating Beach as precedent, the Ninth Circuit
adopts the Court’s divination of congressional intent as binding.
Because the Court’s position is not exactly on point, however, taking
its divination as an unassailable starting point is a second degree of
abstraction. This second level of removal, in turn, leads the Ninth
Circuit to use intent to change the meaning of clear language, not
125
just to construe unclear language.
126
In Rosenfield, the Tenth Circuit agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that consumers must file a complaint in order to trigger
127
128
TILA’s rescission provision and that Beach controls. The Rosenfield
court begins by noting that “an examination of the structure of the
right conferred in this case—that is, rescission—supports [its]
129
conclusion.”
The court stresses that the equitable remedy of
rescission “is not . . . appropriate . . . in circumstances where its
application would lead to prohibitively difficult (or impossible)
130
enforcement.”
The muddying of title that would flow from
accepting notice as sufficient to trigger rescission rises to the level of
131
prohibitive difficulty.
Accordingly, the Rosenfield court states, “we
ascertain no basis for concluding that the TILA rescission remedy
differs in any material respect from the general form of rescission
132
available in . . . analogous contexts.”
The Rosenfield court
acknowledges the CFPB’s contrary position but dismisses the CFPB’s
133
The Tenth
evidence as “mostly concerning matters of state law.”
Circuit affirms that, as a statute of repose, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)
“operates to completely extinguish the right being claimed after it
134
lapses.”
The Rosenfield court, in other words, treats Beach as

125

The circuit performs a similarly flag-raising abstraction with respect to its
earlier decision in Miguel. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the borrowers
had failed to exercise their right to rescind in a timely manner when they notified
and filed suit against the wrong party during the three-year period and attempted to
initiate action against the proper party only after the three years had passed. See id.
at 1329 (discussing Miguel, 309 F.3d at 1162–63).
126
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012).
127
See id. at 1187.
128
See id. at 1188.
129
Id. at 1183.
130
Id. at 1184.
131
See id. at 1185 (chronicling a number of difficulties and burdens that would
flow from allowing rescission-by-notice).
132
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d at 1184 (10th Cir. 2012).
133
Id. at 1186 n.10. See infra Parts III.B and IV.B for a discussion of the CFPB’s
amicus brief.
134
Id. at 1182 (alteration in the original).

HATTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

1/10/2014 3:49 PM

COMMENT

227

135

controlling.
136
137
In Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., the Eighth Circuit majority
explicitly adopts the Tenth Circuit’s analysis: “[W]e agree with the
Tenth Circuit’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion in Rosenfield and
hold that a plaintiff seeking rescission must file suit, as opposed to
merely giving the bank notice, within three years in order to preserve
138
that right pursuant to § 1635(f).”
Like the Tenth Circuit, two
judges of the Eighth Circuit find Beach dispositive: “Extrapolating
from Beach, we hold that to accomplish rescission within the meaning
139
of § 1635(f), the obligor must file a rescission action in court.”
The Kieran majority stresses that it has not abandoned the text:
We are not unmindful of the language of Regulation Z or
the interpretation of that regulation—that notice, as
opposed to filing suit, is enough to preserve the right—that
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), amicus
in this case, has advanced in favor of the plaintiffs.
However, we agree with Rosenfield that the text of the
statute, as explicated in Beach, establishes that filing suit is
140
required.
135

In an unpublished opinion carrying no precedential weight, the Third Circuit
similarly held Beach to control and, consequently, also held that rescission requires
the plaintiff to file a complaint within the three-year window. The Williams court
framed its holding in an interesting way, observing that:
[i]t may be that an obligor may invoke the right to rescission by mere
notice. Mere invocation without more, however, will not preserve the
right beyond the three-year period. Rather, consistent with § 1635(f), a
legal action to enforce the right must be filed within the three-year
period or the right will be “completely extinguishe[d].”
Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 410 F. App’x 495, 499 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998)). The Third Circuit’s
opinion creates a distinction between “invocation of the right to rescind” with nonextinguishment of that right, presumably by exercising it. See id. It is not clear what
it might mean to “invoke” a right when such invocation is not tantamount to
exercising a right. See id.
In its precedential decision of February 5, 2013, however, the Third Circuit
arrived at the opposite conclusion concerning both the applicability of Beach and the
requirements for rescission. See generally Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d
255 (3d Cir. 2013); infra Part III.B.
136
Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013). Both the Keiran
majority and the Keiran dissent find echo in the Eighth Circuit’s subsequent decision
in Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752 (2013).
137
For a discussion of the dissenting Judge’s textualist interpretation of § 1635,
see infra Part III.B.
138
Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728.
139
Id.
140
Id.
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By treating Beach as not only having resolved the issue presented
therein, but also having established a guide to the textual
interpretation of TILA, however, the Eighth Circuit subordinates the
statute’s actual text to Beach’s explication of that text and, in so
doing, adopts the intentionalist interpretation that the Supreme
141
Court decision expounds in relation to another issue.
B. Textualist Decisions
142

In Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, the Fourth Circuit arrives
at the opposite result. The Gilbert court first considers “the plain
meaning of the statute,” because “‘courts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
143
this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.’”
The
Fourth Circuit finds the grail of “plain meaning” within the actual
words of § 1635(f) and therefore declines to supplant or even gloss
those words: “Simply stated, neither 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) nor
Regulation Z says anything about the filing of a lawsuit, and we refuse
144
to graft such a requirement upon them.”
After confining itself to reading the lines—rather than between
the lines—of § 1635(f), the Gilbert court warns that “[w]e must not
conflate the issue of whether a borrower has exercised her right to
rescind with the issue of whether the rescission has, in fact, been
145
completed and the contract voided.” The Fourth Circuit thus draws
a practical distinction between exercising a right to rescind and
146
actual rescission.
“The former,” the Gilbert court insists, “is the
concern of § 1635(f) and Regulation Z, and a borrower exercises her
right of rescission by merely communicating in writing to her creditor
147
her intention to rescind,” even though the borrower must then take
additional steps “[t]o complete the rescission and void the
148
contract.” Like its sister circuits, the Fourth Circuit requires either
141

See id. The Eighth Circuit reiterated its reliance on Rosenfield and, by
extension, on Beach in Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 759–60 (8th Cir. 2013).
142
Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012).
143
Id. at 276 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1981)
(citations and quotation omitted)).
144
Id. at 277.
145
Id.
146
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning stands in contrast to the Third Circuit’s
invoke-exercise dichotomy in its unpublished Williams opinion. See supra note 135.
147
Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277.
148
Id.
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that “the creditor . . . acknowledge that the right of rescission is
available and the parties . . . unwind the transaction amongst
themselves, or [that] the borrower . . . file a lawsuit so that the court
149
may enforce the right to rescind.”
The Gilbert court applies §
1635(f)’s three-year limit to the right to rescind, which can be
exercised by notice, rather than to rescission itself.
The Fourth Circuit was able to strike out on its own largely
because it shrugged off the interpretive shackles of Beach. Gilbert
holds that Beach carries no precedential weight vis-à-vis the rescission
deadline. “Appellees’ reliance on [Beach] is misplaced,” the Gilbert
court holds, because “[t]he Beach Court did not address the proper
method of exercising a right to rescind or the timely exercise of that
150
right.” Just as the Fourth Circuit adheres to the letter of the statute,
it also adheres to the letter of Beach, refusing to embroider meaning
upon the Court’s words.
The Third Circuit took a similar stance in February 2013, with its
Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services decision, announcing that, “[i]n
resolving the question at issue here, we rely on the statutory
151
language, not on the debatable implications of dicta.”
In
determining what is required to trigger rescission under TILA, the
Third Circuit stressed that “nowhere in Beach does the Court address
how an obligor must exercise his right of rescission within that three152
year period,” which the circuit described as the key question raised
153
Though the Sherzer court does note that “Beach is
by the appeal.
consistent with [its] view” that notice suffices to rescind, its more
definitive assertions concerning the inapplicability of Beach dicta
make it clear that “consistency” was not the court’s paramount
154
analytical objective.
Nor does the Third Circuit rely on legislative history in its
analysis. The Sherzer court refers in passing to a 1980 addition to
155
TILA
but otherwise steers clear of the inquiry into congressional
149

Id.
Id. at 278.
151
Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013).
152
Id. at 262 (emphasis in the original).
153
Id. at 257 (“The question presented by this appeal is simple: does an obligor
exercise his right to rescind a loan subject to TILA by so notifying the creditor in
writing, or must the obligor file suit before the three-year period expires?”).
154
Id. at 258. A more felicitous choice of phrase, given the Sherzer court’s
adamant rejection of Beach dicta quoted above, would have been to say that Beach is
not inconsistent with the court’s view of TILA rescission.
155
Id. at 260.
150
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intent that informs the decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
Though the Third Circuit never explicitly rejects intentionalism, it
cements its textualist stance by relegating the policy concerns raised
by the lenders—concerns similar to those raised by the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits in expounding congressional intent—to for-the-sakeof-completion analysis, observing that, “[w]hile the Lenders and their
amici raise several concerns worthy of our careful attention, we find
156
them unpersuasive for the reasons that follow.”
This statement
establishes a clear line between the textual analysis that led to the
court’s decision and the policy-rich analysis that simply bolsters it.
Indeed, the Third Circuit frames its decision in purely textualist
157
terms. The Sherzer court “begin[s] with the statutory text,” and,
158
after scrutinizing § 1635 as a whole, states that “the answer to the
question presented by this appeal is not pellucid, although we do
159
think it is controlled by the statutory language.”
The circuit
musters both affirmative evidence indicating that notice constitutes
rescission and negative evidence that “nothing in the text of the
160
statute supports the view that [filing a complaint is necessary]” to
bolster its determination that “the text of § 1635 and its
implementing regulation . . . supports the view that to timely rescind
a loan agreement, an obligor need only send a valid notice of
161
rescission.”
Ultimately, the Third Circuit rejects the view that
rescission is triggered only by filing a complaint because that view
“would require us to infer that the statute contains additional,
unwritten requirements with which obligors must comply—an
inference that seems particularly inappropriate in light of the fact
162
that TILA is a remedial statute that we must construe liberally.”
156

Id. at 261.
Id. at 258.
158
See id. at 258–61.
159
Id. at 261. Curiously, despite noting a lack of pellucidity, the Third Circuit did
not discuss the possibility of deferring to the CFPB’s interpretation of Regulation Z.
See infra Part IV.B.
160
Id. at 260.
161
Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2013).
162
Id. at 261. This focus on the statute’s remedial purpose may seem more
purposivist than textualist. Indeed, Scalia and Garner fault the remedial purpose
canon for precisely such reasons:
The other problem with the remedial-statute rule is that identifying
what a “liberal construction” consists of in impossible—which means
that it is an open invitation to engage in “purposive” rather than
textual interpretation, and generally to engage in judicial
improvisation.
Of course, “liberal construction” does have an
identifiable meaning if it means (as we suspect it originally did mean)
157
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The Third Circuit thus finds support for its strict, text-based analysis
in the consumer-protective purpose of the statute.
Judge Murphy similarly finds harmony of text and purpose in §
1635 in her elegant Kieran dissent: “The plain language of TILA, its
implementing regulations, and its supporting policy rationales all
support reading § 1635 to mean what it says: that rescission is
163
exercised when a consumer provides written notice to the lender.”
Murphy considers the entirety of the statute and observes that
“[n]owhere in the TILA statute is there any requirement that a
consumer must file a lawsuit in order to exercise a right of
164
rescission.” Nor, Judge Murphy argues, can such an imperative be
imputed from the off-topic Beach or the non-germane distinction
165
between a statute of limitation and a statute of repose.
Judge Murphy bolsters this text-based determination by
166
weighing the policy goals undergirding TILA.
Murphy concedes
that “borrowers may sometimes make rescission claims without any
valid basis,” but notes that “lenders may also deny them without legal
167
right or might take advantage of uninformed consumers.” Murphy
nothing more than rejection of “strict construction” and insistence on
fair meaning. The canon is therefore today either incomprehensible
or superfluous.
Scalia & Garner, supra note 111, at 365–66. Nevertheless, the rule that “a statute . . .
considered remedial . . . should be given a liberal interpretation and should be
construed to give the terms used the most extensive meaning to which they are
readily susceptible,” id. at 364 n.1 (quoting 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60:2, at 268 (7th ed. 2007)), has
been one of the classic canons of interpretation since its invocation by John Jay, the
first Chief Justice, in 1793, id. at 364. Like the other canons of interpretation, the
remedial purpose canon concentrates on the proper way to draw meaning from the
language of a statute, a text-centric inquiry. See, e.g., Elliot M. Davis, Note, The Newer
Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1002–
03 (2007) (including the canons of interpretation among the tools in the “textualist’s
toolbox”).
163
Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 736 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164
Id. at 731 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165
Id. at 732 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166
See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 734–36 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (offering a detailed analysis of policy arguments made by the majority as well
as the parties and their amici). Although Judge Melloy makes a strong textualist
argument as noted infra in the text accompanying note 172, it is important to recall
that he first adopts Murphy’s reasoning: “Were we writing on a clean slate . . . I would
hold for the reasons stated by Judge Murphy in her dissent in Keiran that sending
notice within three years of consummating a loan is sufficient to ‘exercise’ the right
to rescind.” Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J.,
concurring).
167
Keiran, 720 F.3d at 734 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

HATTON (DO NOT DELETE)

232

1/10/2014 3:49 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:207

faults her judicial brethren’s choice as to which of these two potential
wrongdoers should receive the benefit of the legislative doubt: “The
majority expresses much concern about the former issue and very
little about the latter, yet TILA’s status as ‘remedial legislation, to be
construed broadly in favor of consumers,’ dictates which problem
168
Judge Murphy concludes by rejecting the
takes precedence.”
extratextual filing requirement under which “TILA would become a
broad shield for lenders in spite of Congress’ manifest goal of
ensuring that consumers receive an effective rescission right against
169
both original and assignee lenders.”
Shortly after it decided Keiran, it again confronted the question
170
of what borrowers must do to rescind in Hartman v. Smith. Bound
by Keiran, Judge Melloy concurred with the Hartman court’s holding
that filing a complaint is required, but wrote separately to express his
171
disagreement with this determination.
Judge Melloy approves
Judge Murphy’s Keiran dissent and pushes her argument even
further, stressing that the absence of a textual mandate to read §
1635 as requiring borrowers to file suit should suffice to preclude
reading such a requirement into the statute:
That Congress provided a statute of limitations governing
suits for damages demonstrates that it knew how to impose
such a limitation and would have done the same regarding
suits for rescission if it so desired; instead, however, the
provision governing rescission states only that “the obligor
shall have the right to rescind the transaction . . . by
notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the
172
Bureau, of his intention to do so.”
Whereas Judge Murphy bolstered her reading of the statute with
policy considerations, Judge Melloy remains anchored to the text of §
1635. Judge Melloy also adheres to the text of Miguel v. Country
(citations omitted).
168
Id. at 735 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Rand Corp. v. Yer Song Moua, 559 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 2009). See also supra note
162 for a discussion of the remedial purpose canon that Judge Murphy here employs.
169
Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 736 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170
734 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2013). Hartman was decided on August 19, 2013, id.,
just five weeks after Keiran, 720 F.3d at 721. The Hartman appellee lost on appeal
and petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc; a unanimous 8th Circuit
denied these petitions in a two-sentence order on September 26, 2013. Hartman v.
Smith, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, 1 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The petition for rehearing
en banc is denied. The petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.”).
171
Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d at 762 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., concurring).
172
Id. (Melloy, J., concurring) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (emphasis added)).
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173

Funding Corp., which the Ninth Circuit relied on in deciding
174
Judge Melloy
McOmie and which Judge Melloy asserts is off-topic.
thus offers a more purely textualist rationale for finding that notice is
sufficient to rescind; indeed, Judge Melloy faults the majority’s focus
on the practical consequences that might flow from this decision
175
because the statute’s language is plain.
The unrest with respect to TILA’s rescission requirements is
growing in the Eighth Circuit: Since Keiran and Hartman, this circuit
has published yet another opinion on § 1635’s requirements. The
very short per curiam opinion in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc. holds, as do the prior cases, that filing a complaint is necessary to
176
rescind. The two concurrences in this three-judge decision, one by
177
Judge Melloy—citing his Hartman concurrence —and one by Judge
Colloton—citing Judge Murphy’s Keiran dissent as well as the Third
178
Circuit’s opinion in Sherzer —lament the fact that they are bound by
Keiran.
When the losing party petitioned for rehearing in Jesinowski, the
Eighth Circuit denied the petitions in much more dramatic fashion
179
than it did in Hartman : 4 judges—Judge Murphy and three others—
180
dissented, and Judge Colloton concurred because, “[n]o matter
how this court decides this case, there will remain a well-developed
conflict in the circuits on the question of how a consumer may
exercise his or her right to rescind under the Truth in Lending Act,
181
15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).” Judge Colloton then explains why the circuit
split cautions against a rehearing:
It appears that none of these cases was presented to the
Supreme Court by way of petition for writ of certiorari, so it
cannot be said that the Court has resolved to leave the issue
173

309 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2002).
Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 763 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., concurring)
(discussing McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.
2012)).
175
Id. (Melloy, J., concurring) (“I do not believe that requiring lenders to initiate
declaratory-judgment actions—rather than defend in rescission actions—is so
undesirable that it reaches a level of absurdity such that this Court should ignore the
plain language of the statute and Regulation Z.”).
176
729 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 2013).
177
Id. (Melloy, J. concurring).
178
Id. at 1094 (Colloton, J., concurring).
179
See supra note 170.
180
Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23027, 1
(8th Cir. 2013).
181
Id. at *1–2 (Colloton, J., concurring) (collecting cases).
174
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to individual circuits despite a conflict in authority.
Therefore, I conclude that the resources of a rehearing en
banc are not warranted at this time simply to move this
court from one side to the other in what may prove to be a
182
short-lived conflict in the circuits.
Judge Colloton thus anticipates that the Supreme Court of the
United States will weigh in to resolve the split that has divided the
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits from the Third and Fourth
Circuits, a division that the fractured decisions of the Eighth Circuit
echo in microcosm.
IV. HOW SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVE THE SPLIT?
Like the Third Circuit and Judge Murphy, the Court should
heed TILA’s stated purpose—to inform and protect consumers—
before honing in on the text of § 1635 itself when it resolves the
183
present split.
The Act’s umbrella introduction states that TILA
aims “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to
184
protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing.”
The Court should choose an interpretation that best reflects the goals
185
set forth by TILA’s introductory provision.
Here, the textualist interpretation appears more in keeping with
TILA objectives. The Third and Fourth Circuits hold that borrowers
may exercise their right to rescind by notifying the lender of their
186
intent to do so within that three-year window.
The Eighth, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, require that borrowers sue
their lenders within three years of entering into a loan agreement or
187
forever lose the right to rescind.
This intentionalist position
demands a level of awareness on the part of borrowers that seems
188
incongruous with TILA’s objectives. As Judge Murphy’s dissenting
182

Id. at *2 (Colloton, J., concurring).
No petitions for certiorari have been filed as of the time this Comment went
to press.
184
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012).
185
See supra text accompanying note 17.
186
See supra Part III.A.
187
See supra Part III.B; see also O’Melveny & Myers, LLP, TILA Rescission Rights
(June 20, 2012), http://www.omm.com/tila-rescission-rights-06-18-2012/ (offering a
concise summary of the split).
188
See Brief of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal [hereinafter CFPB Amicus Brief] at 23–
24, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172 (2012) (No. 10-1442), 2012 WL
183
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opinion stressed, the decision of the Eighth Circuit majority, like
those of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, “is contrary to the plain
language of TILA, the congressional intent behind it, and the
position of the agency responsible for enforcing it. TILA is ‘remedial
legislation to be construed broadly in favor of consumers,’ yet the
189
majority construes its provisions broadly in favor of lenders.”
Nevertheless, it is not impossible that an intentionalist
interpretation will carry the day, given the Supreme Court’s past
190
decisions.
The Court reached a textualist-intentionalist
191
compromise in Koons Buick and concluded Beach with a discussion
192
The very
of Congress’s “manifest intent,” even if only in dicta.
active circuit split at the center of this Comment reveals that the
193
intentionalist position is not without support.
Whatever its conclusion, the Court should begin by declaring
194
Beach inapposite. Relevant only through its dicta, Beach should not
195
be stretched to apply to rescission mechanics. Rather than expand
the influence of its reasoning, the Court should defer to the CFPB,
196
the agency now charged with TILA regulation.
Deference is
important in an abstract sense as a means of maintaining the
197
boundaries of the different branches of government. With respect
1074082, at *18–19.
189
Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 731 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Rand Corp. v. Yer Song Moua, 559 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir.
2009).
190
Note that, with respect to its emphasis on legislative intent, the limited TILA
jurisprudence explored in Part II of this Comment stands at odds with a statisticallyconfirmed Court trend: “[The Court’s] practice after 1986 (when Scalia joined the
Court) has reflected the influence of new textualism . . . . The Court has been
somewhat more willing to find statutory plain meaning and less willing to consult
legislative history, either to confirm or rebut that plain meaning. . . .” ESKRIDGE,
supra note 1, at 227.
191
See supra Parts II.A and III.
192
See supra Part II.B.
193
See supra Part II.
194
See CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at 15 (“Beach is not directly on
point. . . .”).
195
“When [courts] make law in dictum, the likelihood is high that it will be bad
law.” Laval, supra note 115, at 1260. See generally id. at 1258–62 (stressing that overreading dicta is particularly pernicious in a system based on stare decisis).
196
See generally Letter from Elizabeth Renuart, Assistant Professor of Law at
Albany Law School, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y of Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys. (Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2010
/October/20101025/R-1390/R-1390_102110_54026_556309269172_1.pdf (arguing
the importance of allowing the CFPB to formulate a coherent regulatory scheme).
197
See Aaron R. Cooper, Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency Deference for an Era
of Private Governance, 99 GEO. L.J. 1454–55 (2010–11) (describing judicial review of
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to TILA rescission, moreover, the CFPB’s analysis is compelling and
198
appropriately consumer-protective.
What the Court should not do is resolve the textualistintentionalist debate that has colored TILA litigation in general and
199
the rescission-provision split in particular.
The manner in which
the circuits have articulated their decisions invites the Court to
200
choose a victorious methodology. By resolving the less conspicuous
issues surrounding dicta and deference, however, the Court can
reach a decision without accepting the circuits’ implicit invitations to
201
side with a particular interpretive school.
A. The Scope and Applicability of Beach
The holdings of the Supreme Court are binding upon all the
202
courts of the land. Dicta, however, are not considered binding.
The two can be difficult to distinguish, as the pragmatic Judge Posner
203
has noted: “A dictum is a statement in a judicial opinion that could
have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical
agency determinations as a means of making sure that the agency is not taking an
impermissible amount of legislative power, not as an opportunity for the Court to
“substitute its own judgment for that of the political branch” when that political
branch is acting within the scope of its authority).
198
The CFPB’s fidelity to TILA’s purposes, see supra Part I, weighs strongly in
favor of granting deference, because it is precisely “[w]here an agency’s decision or
interpretation of a statute violates a canon of statutory construction, or where the
agency’s interpretation is inconsistent with the public interest patina of the original
statute, or where a court deems the agency’s action ‘unreasonable,’ [that] the
agency’s decisions will be accorded no deference.” Jonathan R. Macey, Separated
Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 Geo.
L.J. 671, 684 (1992).
199
See supra Parts II and III.
200
See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 117, 119–31 (arguing that textualism can brook no compromise with
intentionalist or purposovist interpretive imperatives, such that any choice other
than pure textualism is a choice against textualism).
201
See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.
202
See, e.g., Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1187 (2012) (quoting Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)) (noting that “[i]n [the] context [of a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to AEDPA,] ‘clearly established law’ signifies ‘the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions’”).
203
Posner is far from the only dicta-theorist, but a full exploration of the hazy,
even fluid, dictum-holding boundary is beyond the scope of the present study. As a
notable counterpart to Posner’s proposed workmanlike explanation of dicta is the
gemologist-inspired approach that its creators “call the ‘Judicial Four Cs.’ Jewelers
evaluate carat, cut, color, and clarity in assessing diamonds; we evaluate constraint,
consideration, clarity, and candor in forming understandings of what to treat as
holding and dicta within judicial opinions.” Michael Abramovicz & Maxwell Stearns,
Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1017 (2005).
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204

foundations of the holding.”
It stands apart from the opinion’s
binding core because it “may not have received the full and careful
205
consideration of the court that uttered it.” For Judge Posner—and
the Seventh Circuit—”[w]hat is at stake in distinguishing holding
from dictum is that a dictum is not authoritative. It is the part of an
opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior court, is free to
206
reject.” Posner thus invites us to “ask what reasons there are against
207
a court’s giving weight to a passage found in a previous opinion.”
As Judge Posner notes, there are many potential reasons for
disregarding dicta, “reasons for thinking that a particular passage was
not a fully measured judicial pronouncement, that it was not likely to
be relied on by readers, and indeed that it may not have been part of
the decision that resolved the case or controversy on which [a
208
federal] court’s jurisdiction depended.” Posner’s know-a-dictum-byits-stakes argument ties “dictumitude,” for lack of a better word, to
209
reader response.
Not all circuits are as willing to risk jettisoning a holding along
210
with the bathwater of dicta as is the Seventh Circuit.
The Third
Circuit explained that “[e]ven if what we read as the holdings . . .
could be characterized as dicta and therefore not binding on us, such
204

Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id.
206
United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988).
207
Id.
208
Id. at 293.
209
Fascinatingly, the Ninth Circuit glossed Posner’s stakes-based definition in a
parenthetical citation as one that “adopt[s] a pragmatic definition of dictum based
upon whether the previous panel fully considered the issue and intended for future
interpreters to rely on it.” United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 916 (9th Cir.
2001) (emphasis added). This is a mischaracterization and, as subtle a misstatement
as it may seem, it is significant inasmuch as it paints Posner’s statement with an
intentionalist brush when, in fact, his working definition of dicta corresponds to a
textualist approach. See Morrell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of
Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 20 (2003) (“[T]extualism . . . employs a readercentered strategy . . . for attributing meaning to a statutory text . . . .
Intentionalism . . . employs a writer-centered strategy for attributing meaning to
statutory text, emphasizing ‘meaning(s)’ ‘intended’ by the writer . . . .”). Here, as
with respect to the TILA rescission provision, the Ninth Circuit focuses on intent. See
infra Part IV.
210
The Seventh Circuit has a strong—and generalized—predilection for straightshooting and has stated its preference for streamlining in eminently quotable terms.
See, e.g., DeShields v. Int’l Resort Props., 463 Fed. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2012)
(quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not
like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”)); see also Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982) (“We deprecate decision by
metaphor.”).
205
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dicta are highly persuasive. Indeed, with regard to statements made
211
by the Supreme Court in dicta, ‘we do not view [them] lightly.’”
Indeed, the circuit noted, “[b]ecause the Supreme Court uses dicta
to help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide
because of its limited docket . . . [t]o ignore what we perceive as
persuasive statements by the Supreme Court is to place our rulings,
212
and the analysis that underlays them, in peril.”
The Ninth Circuit
has also noted the predictive potential and resultant premium borne
by Court dicta, remarking that “dicta of the Supreme Court have a
weight that is greater than ordinary judicial dicta as prophecy of what
that Court might hold. We should not blandly shrug them off
213
because they were not a holding.” The Tenth Circuit has adopted
an even more deferential posture with respect to Supreme Court
dicta: “we are bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by
the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta [are]
214
recent and not enfeebled by later statements.”
Here, however—even for those who favor expansive readings of,
and who accord considerable deference to, Supreme Court dicta—it
is problematic to find authoritative the Beach Court’s hypothesis as to
Congressional intent. Although the Beach Court did declare that it
was respecting the “manifest intent” of Congress, it was less confident
about congressional intent just a few lines earlier, where it discussed
215
what “Congress may well have chosen.”
The Court had already
reached its holding based on a textual analysis before offering
216
intentionalist “evidence” as supplementary support for its decision;
the intentionalist argument is a tack-on. Having reached its decision
on other grounds, the Court indulges in somewhat conflicted
217
speculation regarding Congress’s intent, creating dicta.
And,
211

Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d
548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003)).
212
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
213
Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
214
United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
215
Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 418–19 (1998) (emphasis added).
216
The Court even marks this supplement with a revelatory introductory
sentence: “The Act, however, has left even less to chance (if that is possible) than its
‘expire’ provision would allow, standing alone.” Id. at 417. Though the provision is
enough “standing alone,” in other words, the Court will offer even more support of
its conclusion. See id.
217
Why the dicta are present is an interesting question. They could have been
included by compromise, to accommodate the Justices’ different perspectives. They
could also serve the function of keeping the textualist-intentionalist debate alive and
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because the Court’s first statement impugns the confidence of its
218
second, these dicta should be treated with caution.
The Tenth Circuit—and, by extension, the Eighth Circuit
majority, which explicitly approves and adopts the Tenth Circuit’s
219
reading of Beach —does not display the requisite caution with
respect to Beach dicta. Although the Rosenfield court purports to
220
reach a conclusion “consistent with Beach,” and although the Keiran
221
court suggests that it is reading TILA through the lens of Beach, the
Rosenfield court’s holding that “TILA establishes a right of action that is
generally redressable only when a party seeks recognition of it by
222
invoking the power of the courts” is clearly beyond the scope of the
223
Beach court’s discussion of affirmative defenses.
The Ninth Circuit similarly distorted dicta in reading Beach to
hold that “rescission suits must be brought within three years from
the consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice of
224
rescission is delivered within that three-year period.”
The Ninth
Circuit adds one and one and gets three, with the missing addend
coming from its assumption that when the Court said “completely
extinguish[ed]” in one context, it intended that the extinguishment be
universal because (1) § 1635(f) is a statute of repose and (2) statutes

thriving. Or, of course, they could have been included to suggest that, even in the
face of a clear text, an intentionalist inquiry into Congressional reasoning should be
conducted. See Defining Dicta, supra note 203, at 971–72.
218
Stanley Fish has written that “[f]iguring out what a multiple-authored text
means is in principle no different from figuring out what a single-authored text
means; both require the same ‘necessary construction’ of an intention that the words
alone won’t yield up.” Stanley Fish, Intention and the Canons of Legal Interpretation, THE
N.Y.
TIMES
OPINIONATOR
(July
16,
2012,
9:00
PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/intention-and-the
-canons-of-legal-interpretation/. The idea of intention as a construction, of
something substantial that is built and that can take on a presence of its own,
independent of the words from which it was crafted, is a helpful way to understand
how the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are able to arrive at conclusions that exceed the
scope of Beach while purporting to flow necessarily from Beach.
219
Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013); see also supra
Part III.A (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s decision at length).
220
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012).
221
See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728.
222
Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1183 (emphasis in the original).
223
See, e.g., Keiran, 720 at 736 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Beach . . . did not address how a consumer
rescinds a loan.”).
224
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.
2012).
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of repose mean sue or see the right extinguished.
Not only does
Beach never mention statutes of repose, but there are many statutes of
226
repose that do not require filing suit. The Ninth Circuit’s syllogism
is thus flawed.
The three circuits that have read Beach as controlling have done
so by guessing what the Court intended to say and by applying what
the Court did say on one topic to a discrete issue. The Court should
declare Beach inapposite even if it agrees that borrowers must file to
227
rescind. A determination that filing is necessary should be reached
through case-specific analysis; it should not be the child of chance,
228
If the Court
the results of a fortuitous misapplication of dicta.
holds that Beach applies, it would implicitly condone using
229
perceptions of its own intent as a proxy for legislative intent.
As
one student commentator notes, “[i]n a dire economic atmosphere
where predatory lending has contributed to widespread home
foreclosures, courts should not take it upon themselves to speculate
on alternative theories of congressional intent, especially when the
230
purpose, history, and letter of the law are so clear.”
225

See id. at 1329.
See the CFPB’s excellent discussion of statutes of repose, CFPB Amicus Brief,
supra note 188, at *20–24. The CFPB’s analysis is discussed infra Part IV.B.
227
Thomas L. Fowler’s astute analysis of the risks posed by overstated dicta in an
unrelated case captures general principles of jurisprudence that should guide the
Court in its ultimate resolution of TILA rescission:
The analysis and the language chosen by the Court in Fly obscure the
normal guideposts that lower courts use to make this holding versus
dictum determination. As a result, the lower courts will be encouraged
to abandon the difficult determination of what the law is and instead
substitute the determination of what the law will be based upon the
various statements found in the opinion without regard to whether
such statements are holding or dictum.
Thomas L. Fowler, Of Moons, Thongs, Holdings and Dicta: State v. Fly and the Rule of
Law, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 253, 259 (2000).
228
See generally id. at 296–302 (discussing why it is important to maintain clear
boundaries between dicta and holdings).
229
See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 418–19 (1998). For an excellent
cautionary tale regarding the perils and pitfalls of trying to divine the Court’s intent,
see Brian J. Dunne, Comment, Enforcement of the Medicaid Act Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
after Gonzaga University v. Doe: The “Dispassionate Lens” Examined, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
991, 1003–12 (2007) (studying the methodological conflicts in the wake of the
Court’s decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)). As Dunne
notes, “While Gonzaga no doubt commands a text-focused analysis in determining §
1983 enforceability of Medicaid Act provisions, lower courts have divided into two
distinct camps regarding the proper ‘type’ of textual analysis.” Id. at 1003.
230
Michael Sabet, Comment, Slamming the Door in the Consumer’s Face: Courts’
Inadequate Enforcement of TILA Disclosure Violations and the False Hope of a Foreclosure
Defense, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 183, 210 (2010).
226
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B. An Alternative: Look to the CFPB
Even without heeding Sabet’s exhortation to look solely to the
letter of the law, however, the Court need not resort to mangling the
square Beach peg until it fits into the round hole of TILA rescission
mechanics. There is highly persuasive authority available to aid in
interpreting § 1635(f) and Regulation Z: the CFPB.
The CFPB’s responsibilities include “[w]riting rules,
supervis[ing] companies, and enforc[ing] federal consumer financial
231
protection laws.”
“Congress granted the [CFPB] the authority to
232
“With the
interpret and promulgate rules regarding TILA.”
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, [it] transferred this authority from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Bureau on July 21,
233
2011.”
Aggressively asserting its authority over TILA, the CFPB
“welcome[s] . . . suggestions of pending cases that might make good
234
candidates for the amicus program.” The Bureau’s amicus program
235
has filed briefs in each rescission case. The CFPB’s interventionist
policy matches the latitude Congress explicitly granted to the
executive branch—the branch it tasked with determining how to
236
enforce the Act. Congress has passed the baton of TILA regulation
from the Federal Reserve Board to the CFPB and, with it, this
regulatory latitude.

231

CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/thebureau/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2013).
232
CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *3 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481(12)(O),
5512(b)(1), 5581(b)(1)).
233
Id. (citing Pub L. No. 111-243, §§ 1061(b)(1), (d) (2010), codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5581(b)(1), (d) (2010)); Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57, 252 (Sept. 20,
2010).
234
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov
/amicus/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
235
See Robert Bostrom, CFPB Files Amicus Brief in TILA Case, Says More To Come,
LEXOLOGY (Apr. 12, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=40012926-2522-457b-99bc-f182dd385d7f (“The Bureau sees the filing
of amicus briefs as an important way to ensure that the statutes it oversees are
correctly and consistently interpreted by the courts, even in cases in which the CFPB
is not itself a named party.”).
236
See supra Part I (discussing how Congress has transferred TILA regulation
from the Federal Reserve Board to the CFPB). It is only logical that the same
regulatory leeway transfers as well. The question of whether judicial deference passes
is more complex. See infra pp. 34–35.
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In its amicus briefs, the CFPB argues that “[t]he language of §
1635 is plain: Within three years of loan consummation, consumers
must exercise their right of rescission by notifying their lender that they
238
are doing so.” The CFPB adds that, “[i]f there were any ambiguity
in that mandate, Regulation Z resolves it by also specifying that
consumers exercise the right to rescind by providing written notice to
239
the lender.”
Because there is no room for confusion, in other
words, inquiry should begin and end with the text.
Ironically, if the CFPB is correct that the regulation is
unambiguous, there is less reason for the Court to defer to it: If the
regulation is clear, the Court will apply it without consulting the
240
regulatory agency.
If, on the other hand, the Court finds
Regulation Z unclear, it will have to address whether and to what
extent administrative deference has shifted from the Board to the
241
Bureau, just as it will need to discuss the deference due to a
242
These complicated treks
position expounded in an amicus brief.
237

The CFPB’s amicus briefs feature identical standards sections and differ only
in applying the standards to the particular facts of each case. See CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/amicus/ (last visited Aug.
30, 2013) (collecting the CFPB amicus briefs).
238
CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *10.
239
Id.
240
See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1663,
146 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2000)
(Noting, with respect to Auer deference, but in terms general enough to apply to
agency deference in general: “[D]eference is warranted only when the language of
the regulation is ambiguous . . . . To defer to the agency’s position [with respect to
an unambiguous regulation] would be to permit the agency, under the guise of
interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation”).
241
See TROUTMAN SANDERS, http://www.troutmansanders.com/judicial-deferenceto-agencys-interpretation-of-tila-reaches-new-high-water-mark-02-01-2011/ (last visited
Dec. 23, 2012) (“When authority over TILA interpretation transfers to the new CFPB,
presumably this judicial deference to the agency interpretation will follow. For this
and other reasons, there should be no wonder why the struggle over the creation of,
and the new leadership for, and the role of Congressional over[sight] over, the CFPB
was and is such a hot topic in Washington.”). See also Melanie E. Walker, Comment,
Congressional Intent and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1341, 1361–66 (1999) (exploring the implications for judicial deference when
Congress transfers authority from one agency to another).
242
Particularly relevant to determining the level of deference due the CFPB in
this matter is “Skidmore deference,” which recognizes that “the rulings,
interpretations and opinions of the [relevant federal agency], while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). “The weight of such a judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
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through the murky waters of deference rules will only be necessary if
243
the Court determines that the regulation is ambiguous.
Even without the benefit of formal deference, however, the
CFPB’s arguments are persuasive because they advance both TILA’s
consumer-protective purpose and public policy. “Congress enacted §
1635,” the Bureau notes, “in response to fraudulent homeimprovement schemes in which ‘homeowners, particularly the poor,’
were ‘trick[ed] . . . into signing contracts at exorbitant rates, which
244
turn out to be liens on the family residences.’”
To require that
borrowers sue “is contrary to the plain language of the provision and
contravenes the purpose of the statutory scheme to provide
consumers a private, non-judicial mechanism to rescind mortgage
245
loans.” Indeed, the CFPB regards rescission as a means of avoiding
246
If a lender
litigation and conserving “valuable judicial resources.”
wishes to challenge a borrower’s rescission, then the lender can sue
to determine “whether rescission was accomplished because the party
247
was entitled to rescind in the first instance.”
The CFPB’s
interpretation places the onus of filing a complaint on the lender,
who is presumably more sophisticated and better able to assess the
wisdom of litigation than the borrower. This is a more socially
responsible position than the suit requirement, which would reward
inaction on the part of lenders and force borrowers into court,

and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id.
According to Skidmore, the fact that the agency’s determination is presented not
through the adversarial system but, rather, through an amicus brief is no reason to
discount it as persuasive authority. See id. at 139–40.
243
As the Court recently stated,
[w]e need not decide which party’s interpretation is more persuasive,
however; both are plausible, and the text alone does not permit a more
definitive reading. Accordingly, we find Regulation Z to be ambiguous
as to the question presented, and must therefore look to the Board’s
own interpretation of the regulation for guidance in deciding this case.
Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011). When Chase was
decided, the CFPB had not yet assumed control of regulating TILA. See, e.g.,
MARYLAND
DEP’T
OF
LABOR
LICENSING
AND
REGULATION,
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/advisories/advisorycfpb.shtml (last visited Aug.
30, 2013) (noting that the CFPB became operational in the week of July 28, 2011); see
also Chase, 131 S. Ct. at 871 (providing a decision date of January 24, 2011).
244
CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *4 (quoting 90 CONG. REC. H14384
(daily ed. May 22, 1968) (statement of Rep. Sullivan)) (citing 90 CONG. REC. H14388
(statement of Rep. Patman)).
245
Id. at *25.
246
Id. at *5.
247
Id. at *16.
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discouraging private settlement and rendering notice superfluous.
The Court should apply the CFPB’s sound interpretation of
TILA’s rescission provision. In this way, the Court would respect both
the plain language enacted by the legislature, to which the CFPB
adheres, and Congress’s intent to allow the executive branch to fill
TILA’s broad outlines with the details of enforcement. As the
Hartman concurrence sagely observes, “caution requires attentiveness
to the views of the administrative entity appointed to apply and
enforce a statute,” and “deference is especially appropriate in the
process of interpreting [TILA] and Regulation Z,” unless such
249
deference would lead to “demonstrably irrational” results. It could
250
well be that the policy advocated by the CFPB will prove disastrous,
248

See Sabet, supra note 230, at 210–11. If the consumers’ right to sue expires
after three years, then there is a perverse incentive for lenders to ignore borrowers’
notices of rescission or, perhaps worse, to respond to them in a misleading, string-along manner, so that borrowers miss the three-year filing limit. See generally id.; see
also CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *19.
249
Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 764 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., concurring)
(quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980)).
Judge Melloy is alone in advocating agency deference in this case. The CFPB filed its
first rescission-provision brief in Rosenfield. The Tenth Circuit’s only reference to the
CFPB’s brief is relegated to a footnote and does not address agency deference. See
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We
acknowledge receipt of two amicus curiae briefs, one filed by the [CFPB], a federal
regulatory agency . . . . Although these briefs largely cover the same terrain as the
parties’ arguments, they are helpful. We do exercise appropriate care, however, to
keep our primary focus on the parties’ arguments.” (citations omitted)). The Third
Circuit barely gave the CFPB a passing nod in Sherzer; it certainly did not raise the
question of deference. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 257 (3d
Cir. 2013) (“The Sherzers and their amicus, the [CFPB] argue that [notice
suffices].”). The Keiran majority, Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728
(8th Cir. 2013), refers to the CFPB’s amicus brief, but does not mention deference;
the Keiran dissent does not even mention the brief. To keep track of CFPB amicus
filings, see CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 237.
250
The fear of the dangers of cloudy title underlies the Tenth Circuit’s decision,
see supra Part III.A. It is also of great concern to the three vast banking organizations
that banded together to file an amicus brief in the Rosenfield case. Brief of the Amici
Curiae Am. Bankers Assoc., Consumer Bankers Assoc., and Consumer Mortgage
Coalition in Support of Appellees at 9, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172 (No.
10-1442), 2012 WL 1656043, at *2 (arguing that allowing mere notice to trigger
rescission “would cast a long shadow of uncertainty over the housing finance market,
a market that depends on certainty and predictability. The price for that uncertainty
would fall squarely on the very individuals that TILA was meant to benefit—
borrowers.”). The banking associations’ brief also points to potential injustice that
rescission-by-notice could work upon lenders: notice-triggered rescission “would
allow a borrower to strip a lender who complied with TILA of its security interest
instantaneously and unilaterally.” Id. Aaron B. Millar paints the potential
consequences to lenders in vivid detail: “Imagine this scenario: Hours before the
foreclosure sale, the mortgage lender receives a fax from the defaulting borrower’s
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251

but this is not a foregone conclusion. This politicized matter is best
left to the executive and, thus, at least theoretically, to the collective
252
By respecting the regulatory power that
will of the voting public.
Congress conferred upon the executive, moreover, the Court would
satisfy the mandates of both textualism and intentionalism in a way
253
that holding Beach to govern would not.
V. CONCLUSION
Resolution of TILA’s rescission requirements is but a certseeking petition away. Because (1) TILA’s stated aim is one of
consumer protection, (2) Congress built room into TILA to allow the
government to adapt Regulation Z to the deceptive practices of
creditors, and (3) the plain language of Regulation Z suggests that
notice triggers rescission, the Court should hold that borrowers may
rescind by notifying lenders of their intent to do so.
In reaching this determination, the Court will not need to defer
to the CFPB’s interpretation of the statute. The CFPB’s policy
arguments are compelling on their own terms. While the textualist
lawyer stating that the borrower rescinds the loan . . . because the finance charge in
the loan disclosures was understated by $36.” Aaron B. Millar, The Mortgage Lender’s
Primer on a TILA Rescission Claim, 25 UTAH B. J. 40, 40 (2012).
251
See CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *18–19 & n.4 (countering the
objections raised by the Bankers’ Associations—see supra note 250—by stressing that
requiring notice within the three-year period alerts the lender to the customer’s
rescission and allows the lender to contest the rescission, at which point the borrower
would have a finite period of time—that the courts will have to determine—to file
suit); see also Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 263–67 (3d Cir. 2013)
(analyzing the policy implications of rescission-by-notice at length and concluding
that, though this method of rescission could create some complications, these
complications did not constitute a “reason to disregard the text of the statute” and
that “it is for Congress—not the courts—to determine” such policy matters).
252
One scholar argues that the judiciary should only make determinations with
regard to policy choice in the absence of both statutory clarity and any indicia of
legislative and/or political preferences and that, even under those circumstances,
“the judiciary should exclude those policy preferences it is confident could not get
enacted in the current political process.” EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES:
HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 234 (2008). Given that the CFPB is a
creature of the current political regime, the Court should hesitate to adopt an
interpretation diametrically opposed to the one that the CFPB proposes. See also
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163–66 (1982) (arguing
that the formerly antimajoritarian role formerly played by courts as makers of the
common law should be restricted to matters of constitutional adjudication in light of
the proliferation of statutes and the resultant change in the nature of law-making in
this country).
253
See Mullins, supra note 209, at 31 (suggesting that modern theoretical
approaches to statutory construction “recognize that neither ‘textualism’ nor
‘intentionalism’ provide, by themselves, a satisfactory theory”).
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courts, true to the methodology they espouse, declined to season
their analyses with sociopolitical considerations, the CFPB showed no
such reluctance. The CFPB explained in convincing detail how the
notice-only requirement fits both TILA’s stated purpose and the
hardships borrowers currently face.
Even if the Court should determine that one must sue to
rescind, however, it should decline to massage the boundaries of
precedent. The Court should declare Beach inapplicable to rescission
mechanics. By analyzing the provision independently of its earlier
decision, the Court should confirm that its non-binding conjecture as
to Congressional intent cannot be substituted for inquiry into
Congressional intent.
Although the Court should take the intentionalist Circuits to
task for misrepresenting dicta as precedent, the Court should not
frame its correction as a condemnation of intentionalism. The
current split appears to be a textualist-intentionalist tussle, but victory
need not and should not be tied to a mode of analysis. The
multiplicity of methodologies that led to the feisty Koons Buick
opinion keeps statutory construction lively and staves off wooden
positivism. Ideally, analytical sparks will fly again when the Court
decides the rescission-provision split.

